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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
S & G, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
-vs-
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State 
Engineer of the State of Utah, 
Defendant-
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 860555 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
S & G, Inc., the Plaintiff-Appellant, ("S & G") sought 
judicial review in the Trial Court from a Decision of the 
Defendant-Respondent State Engineer ("State Engineer11) which 
sharply limited the amount of water which S & G could sever from 
228 acres of land in Millard County and transfer into the 
culinary supply system of Delta City. The only issue before the 
State Engineer and the Trial Court was the limitation on the 
quantity of water which the State Engineer would allow S & G to 
transfer. S & G, severely limited in that quantity by the State 
Engineer's decision, filed its Complaint under §73-3-14, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (Addendum p. i) in the District Court of 
Millard County for plenary review of the State Engineer's 
Decision. 
The State Engineer moved to dismiss the Complaint on 
the ground that S & G had already conveyed to Delta City whatever 
rights it had to use water on the 228 acres and therefore had no 
standing to sue. 
DISPpSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Motion was submitted to the Trial Court on briefs 
without oral argument. 
On September 9, 1986 the Court entered a Ruling 
dismissing the Complaint (R.107) and on September 17th entered a 
"Revised Ruling11 ordering that the Motion be treated as one for 
Summary Judgment, granting the Summary Judgment, and dismissing 
the Complaint (R.92,93). On October 9, 1986 a formal "Order and 
Judgment" (Addendum p. ii) was entered in which the Trial Court 
recited that S & G "had some interest in the Decision of the 
State Engineer" but that "such interest was not within the 'Zone 
of Interest1 contemplated as being a basis for appeal from the 
Decision of the State Engineer" and dismissed S & Gfs action with 
prejudice (R.102,103)-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Appellant will be referred to as "S & G" 
and Defendant-Respondent as the "State Engineer". 
In 1980 S & G owned in Millard County 228 acres of land 
with the right to divert and use 5 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) 
of water from a well thereon from April 1 to October 31 of each 
year under a Certificate issued by the State Engineer in 1967 
(R.89). Translated into units, 5 c.f.s. for those 214 days of 
permitted pumping is the equivalent of 2140 acre feet of water 
annually. S & G alleged in its Complaint that 2140 acre feet 
had been beneficially consumed on its land (R.2). [The 
Certificate of Appropriation to do so is attached as Addendum p. 
v.] 
By a contract dated July 22, 1980 S & G agreed to sell 
a fixed portion of its water right (521 acre feet) to IPA 
(R. 49-61) but this contract was amended in April 1981 (the 
"Amendment") to sell the entire water right. The Amendment 
(R.63-69) contains the only contract provisions material to this 
case (R.63-67). In the Amendment the quantity of water sold was 
increased to "***sufficient water*** to satisfy the sole 
irrigation requirements of 228 acres of land***", i.e.: 2140 
acre feet, (R.63, U3) subject, however to the qualifying 
elaboration that the amount sold would be that quantity 
!f
***approved for diversion and use for municipal purposes under 
the proposed change application [required by §73-3-3, U.C.A., 
1953] referred to *** hereinafter" (R.64, sub-13). [These 
provisions of the contract are attached as Addendum pp. vi and 
vii. ] 
Dispositive of the simple issue before the Court is the 
language of the Amendment (R.64) [exhibited at Addendum p. vii] 
which fixes the precise procedure for determining the ultimate 
purchase price. 
One c.f.s. running continuously for 24 hours yields 2 acre 
feet [the amount necessary to cover 1 acre to a depth of 2 feet]. 
Five c.f.s. thus equals 10 acre feet per day x 214 days equals 
2,140 acre feet. Calculation: 60 [seconds] x 60 [minutes] x 24 
[hours] = 86,400. One acre = 43,560 sq. ft.; 2 acres = 87,120 
sq. ft. x 1 cubic foot of water = 2 acres inundated one foot in 
depth (in one day). 
11
 [the purchase price shall be ultimately 
ascertained by calculating] 
***(c) The sum equal to Eight Hundred 
Seventy-Five Dollars ($875.00) times the 
number of acre feet in excess of 521.0 acre 
feet annually which shall be approved for 
diversion and use for municipal purposes 
under the proposed change application 
referred to in paragraph 8 hereinafter by 
(i) the final written Decision of 
the Utah State Engineer without judicial 
review, or 
(ii) the final judgment of approval 
by the appropriate District Court without 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, or 
(iii) the final decision of approval 
by the Utah Supreme Court. 
In the event the Utah State Engineer in the 
first instance, or the Court on judicial 
review thereafter, does not fix the quantity 
of water in acre feet which can be diverted 
and used for such municipal purposes under 
such change application the quantity will be 
presumed to be 4.0 acre feet per acre for 
purposes of fixing the amount of the 
foregoing payment.*** (R.64 and Addendum 
p.vii) [Emphasis added] 
Thus S & G's water right was purchased in its entirety 
by Intermountain Power Agency ("IPA") to be used by the City of 
Delta. (Purchase by IPA of the water right for Delta paid a part 
of IPAfs "impact" obligations imposed upon it for construction 
and other permits issued by Millard County for IPA's 
establishment of a massive electric power plant in the County 
[R.46 - last sentence].) The water right transaction involved in 
this case was exclusively by the foregoing contract. The well 
sold is in a huge acquifer of unlimited resource; therefore the 
only restriction on ability to deliver the entire 5 c.f.s. (2140 
acre feet) would be limitations imposed by the State Engineer 
(R.2,3; allegations of the Complaint which should be assumed to 
be true for purposes of this appeal). 
The contract also provided that if the State Engineer 
fixed no specific quantity then the arbitrary figure of 4 acre 
feet of water per acre of S & G!s land would be the measure of 
compensation from IPA to S & G (R.64 and Addendum vii). S & G 
maintained that it had, historically and consistently, applied to 
beneficial use and actually depleted in excess of nine (9) acre 
feet of water each year on each of the 228 acres from which the 
water was severed (R.2,3 and see conversion of c.f.s. to acre 
feet, f.n. 1 at p. 3, supra). 
The State Engineer, after an administrative hearing, 
fixed the amount transferrable from S & G to Delta at 3.4 acre 
feet per acre (R.47) being a minimum of 365 acre feet and a 
maximum of 1570 less than S & Gfs reasonable expectations and 
definitely lower than even the best estimate of IPA (R.64). The 
State Engineer's rationale was that only 3.4 acre feet was 
actually consumed at the existing well and therefore to transfer 
more water would enlarge S & G's right (R.46-48). This 
conclusion was vigorously challenged by S & G (R.2). 
It is undisputed that IPA has contracted to pay and 
will pay S & G for all the water it can legally transfer to Delta 
City (R.2 [Complaint 18]; R.ll [Answer conceding this allegation 
16]). 
S & G's predicate for judicial review is that its 
contract with IPA was and is still executory, i.e.: the parties 
have never quantified the amount of water transferable and that 
it cannot be ascertained what dollar amount was owed on IPA's 
liability to S & G without judicial review in which S & G has a 
right to prove, if possible, that the State Engineer's reduction 
from over 9 to 3.4 acre feet of water was an unreasonable 
limitation on the amount of water which S & G could transfer to 
Delta City (Complaint, R.2,3). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
S & G has a contract right to sell and to be paid for 
all of the water transferable from the land in Millard County. 
The purpose of this litigation is to fix the amount of water 
transferrable and this very litigation was contemplated by the 
sales contract to IPA. 
The Trial Court dismissed S & G's Complaint on the 
ground that it had no standing to sue. 
The argument of S & G for reversal of that ruling can 
be summarized as follows: 
1. Both the buyer and seller contemplated a higher 
quantity of water than the State Engineer allowed S & G to 
transfer. S & G has never been paid the purchase price because 
it has never been judicially determined, as the contract 
contemplated, how much water could be transferred. The contract 
contemplated a judicial determination in the event any appeal 
were taken from the State Engineer's decision. 
2. Even though S & G had deeded its water right to IPA 
the contract survived the deed as respect to provision for the 
amount of payment; and these judicial proceedings are to resolve, 
by final appeal to the courts, the amount which S & G can 
transfer, which is the measure of S & G's compensation. 
3. S & G's claims and entitlements are within the 
"Zone of Interest" clearly contemplated by the statute 
authorizing judicial review of decisions of the State Engineer 
(§73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953). 
A. S & G's water right is a valuable vested property 
interest and unless it has recourse to the courts under the 
statute which authorizes plenary review by any aggrieved party 
S & G will be severely prejudiced and its property taken without 
due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THIS ACTION IS MAINTAINABLE FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF ESTABLISHING TITLE TO THE WATER S & G SOLD 
TO DELTA CITY. 
A. THE CONTRACT REMAINS EXECUTORY. 
B. A VENDOR MAY ALWAYS MAINTAIN AN ACTION 
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES TO CURE DEFECTS IN 
TITLE. 
POINT II 
S & G IS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY AND MUST BE 
INCLUDED IN ANY PLENARY REVIEW. 
POINT III 
THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST IS TO BE APPLIED 
WITH LIBERAL GENEROSITY TO ONE WHOSE RIGHTS 
ARE AFFECTED. 
POINT IV 
WATER RIGHTS ARE VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
POINT V 
THE ISSUES WERE NOT MOOT. 
POINT VI 
S & G IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS ACTION IS MAINTAINABLE FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF ESTABLISHING TITLE TO THE WATER S & G SOLD 
TO DELTA CITY. 
A. THE CONTRACT REMAINS EXECUTORY. 
Since the Court below held that S & G had no standing 
to sue Article III Section 3(c) of the Amendment (Addendum p.vii) 
is of conclusive significance to this appeal. That sub-section 
provides that until the quantity of water in acre feet which can 
be severed and used for municipal purposes is decided by a final 
written Decision of approval by the appropriate District Court or 
the final decision of approval by the Utah Supreme Court the 
quantity of water useable for such municipal purposes under such 
change application the quantity will be presumed to be 4.0 acre 
feet per acre for purposes of fixing the amount of the payment 
(R.64). This obviously leaves the amount of final payment due 
S & G to the Courts if any party is dissatisfied with the State 
Engineer's ruling. S & G is dissatisfied and has exercised its 
contract right to access to the Court because the State Engineer 
ruled that only 3.4 acre feet of water per acre of land could be 
transferred to Delta City for municipal purposes (R.47) whereas 
S & G claims in excess of nine is transferable. 
Paragraph 7 of the Agreement between S & G and IPA 
provides that the sum prescribed in paragraph 3(c) shall be paid 
by IPA directly to the Seller upon the expiration of time for 
judicial review (R.65). This appeal is timely (R.48, 1). An 
earlier agreement between S & G and IPA sought the water for 
industrial purposes (R.49) and fixed a definite amount of water 
in acre footage, to-wit: 521 acre feet to be paid for in one sum 
(R.52). This obviously would not have involved a question about 
entitlement to deliver the total water supply contemplated by the 
earlier agreement because S & G had the gross entitlement of 
2,140 acre feet or approximately 4 times that contemplated by the 
July 22, 1980 agreement (see footnote 1, page 3 in Statement of 
Facts). 
By amending the Water Right Purchase Contract to 
convert the supply from industrial to municipal purposes the 
parties to the contract intended that a minimum of 4 acre feet 
per acre would be allowed but that the City of Delta would 
acquire all of the water which could be transferred from the 228 
acres (R.63,64). The contract of April, 1981 which is found at 
those pages (R.63,64) did not specify a fixed quantity of water 
in acre footage to be affected by the agreement but "presumed11 
that it would be at least 4 acre feet and if no judicial review 
were pursued it would be that amount the State Engineer would 
permit to be transferred. This case falls squarely within the 
contemplation of the rule that a vendor does not have to have 
complete title to the property sold until the purchaser has made 
his payments. Marlow Investment Corporation vs. Radmall, 485 
P. 2d 1402 (Utah 1971). In that case the vendors disposed of a 
part of the property sold while the purchaser was in default. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that this would not excuse the 
purchaser from his obligation to make payments. 
In Corporation Nine vs. Taylor, 513 P.2d 417, 30 U.2d 
47 (1973), the encumbrance was in the form of a mortgage and the 
Court said: 
"The law does not require the vendor to have 
clear and marketable title at all times 
during the performance of his contract, and 
is not ordinarily so obliged until the time 
comes for him to perform11. (513 P.2d at 417) 
The same ruling can be found in Woodard^ et ux. vs. 
Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398. 
Thus, until final compensation is payable the vendor 
always can continue to perfect or enhance the quality of his 
title. 
A contract is executory when there remain particular 
things which are the object of a contract left to be performed. 
17 Am.Jur.2d p. 341, Contracts, §6. A contract where the total 
purchase price has not been finally determined would therefore be 
an "executory11 contract. 
S & G has not transferred nor been paid for any more 
water than the State Engineer would permit it to transfer. In 
fact, IPA has not paid S & G for the full 3.4 acre feet per acre 
allowed by the State Engineer precisely because there has been no 
final legal disposition of the case. S & G is damaged by a 
decision of the State Engineer which makes it impossible to 
deliver the water which will produce the consideration S & G 
reasonably expected to be paid. 
B. A VENDOR MAY ALWAYS MAINTAIN AN ACTION 
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES TO CURE DEFECTS IN 
TITLE. 
It is elemental, almost too obvious to require 
argument, that a vendor may always endeavor to cure defects or 
insufficiencies in the vendor's title (77 Am.Jur.2d p.403, Vendor 
and Purchaser §229). 
It is a common form of action, universally entertained 
by the courts, for a vendor to bring his title up to a standard 
which will insure to the vendor a quality of title conforming 
most closely to the expectation of the parties. In the last 
cited treatise at page 407, Vendor and Purchaser §233 the text 
writer states: 
"Defects in the title rendering it 
unmarketable frequently are obviated by 
appropriate proceedings to that end in a 
court having jurisdiction of the subject 
matter and the parties, wherein a decree is 
made, the effect of which is to render the 
vendor's title marketable***" 
Similar statements are found throughout Part E of 77 
Am.Jur.2d (§§229-240) one of which cites the Utah case of Woodard 
vs. Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (77 Am.Jur.2d p.408 f.n. 95) 
as authority authorizing curative or corrective action at all 
times during the executory period of the contract. 
If a vendor is allowed to cure defects or settle title 
questions up until a contract is entirely consummated how may it 
be seriously argued that the vendor has no standing to sue? 
POINT II 
S & G IS AN AGGRIEVED PARTY AND MUST BE 
INCLUDED IN ANY PLENARY REVIEW. 
Section 73-3-14, U.C.A., 1953 authorizes any person 
"aggrieved" by a Decision of the State Engineer to bring a civil 
action in the District Court for plenary review thereof. An 
aggrieved party is one suffering a direct injury and actual 
damages as stated in Vol. 1A C.J.S. p.444, Actions, §58, 
***the party to sue is one whose right, or a 
duty to whom, has been violated*** 
S & G is the only one whose right (to water) has been affected 
because S & G still owns whatever it has not been paid for; and 
is the one a duty to whom has been violated because Delta City is 
not paying anything for the water right and IPA has not paid and 
will not pay for more than the water determined to be 
transferrable by the State Engineer. S & G is the aggrieved 
party. 
Section 73-3-14, U.C.A.1953 authorizing appeals from 
the State Engineer to the District Court provides that the review 
shall be "plenary". 
Plenary review is the broadest of all types of 
appellate examinations. The word "plenary" means full, entire, 
complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified. Mashunkashey vs. 
Mashunkashey, et al., 134 P.2d 976, 979, 191 Okl. 521 (1942). 
"Plenary Review" is defined as a "full review, a 
complete review." D&RGWER vs. PSC, 100 P. 2d 552, 555, 98 Utah 
431 (1940). "Plenary [power]" gives a court jurisdiction "as 
broad as equity and justice require." London Co. vs. Joslowitz , 
279 App.Div. 280, 110 NYS.2d 58. 
To exclude S & G as a party having intense interest in 
the outcome of the State Engineer's decision is to remove the 
term "plenary" from the review statute. 
POINT III 
THE "ZONE OF INTEREST" TEST IS TO BE APPLIED 
WITH LIBERAL GENEROSITY TO ONE WHOSE RIGHTS 
ARE AFFECTED. 
S & G suffers a demonstrably severe injury to its 
rights by the administrative decision of the State Engineer. The 
fact it had deeded its water right to Delta City was not, in the 
most extreme interpretation of the facts, the consummate or final 
act making the contract fully executed. At the expense of 
repetition, S & Gfs contract rights are totally dependent upon a 
"final judgment of approval [of the quantity of transferable 
water] by the appropriate District Court*** or the final decision 
of approval by the Utah Supreme Court" (Addendum p.vii). 
Nevertheless the District Court held S & G not to be within the 
"Zone of Interest" contemplated by the statute authorizing 
plenary judicial review of decisions of the State Engineer. 
A recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit treats the subject of "interest" in a 
straightforward manner, observing that the policies underlying 
the "interest" requirement are generic and must be applied to the 
particular facts of each case (736 F.2d at p. 1420). In 
Sanguine^ Ltd. vs. U.S. Department of Interior
 f 736 F.2d 1416 
(C.A. Okla. 1984) a mineral lease was involved which obliged 
interest-holders in the minority of lands affected by the lease 
to adhere to a cooperative (unit) agreement adopted by the 
majority and then approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 
Nine individual movants-in-intervention sought to be heard and 
the government resisted on the grounds of untimeliness and 
failure of an interest "relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action11 under Rule 24, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (closely parallel to Utah's Rule with the same 
number). Irrespective of the language of the respective Federal 
and State procedural rules, the question of "interest" 
sufficient, under either rule, to maintain the litigation was met 
head-on. The Circuit Court handled it as "a practical guide to 
disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned 
persons as is compatible with *** due process" (Id. p.1420). The 
government pressed an argument strikingly synonymous to the State 
Engineers, i.e.: "the leases in issue do not grant intervenors 
a voice in accepting or rejecting a communitization agreement and 
consequently their interest is too remote to justify 
intervention." The State Engineer is saying here that because 
S & G had conveyed (albeit subject to the contract) they could 
not object to the administrative decision. 
The likelinesses of Sanguine with this case do not end 
there. The Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs had 
made a ruling affecting the potential but unrealized (or even 
unascertainable) interests of the movants. Also, the movants 
asserted that their interests were "not adequately represented1 
Delta City, grantee in the deed upon which the State Engineer 
supports his position, did not even appear in the administrative 
hearing of the State Engineer (R.46) and is thus far absent here 
to represent anyone in the material issue. 
The Tenth Circuit held it was sufficient that the 
movants could show a direct economic benefit in a ruling which 
might be favorable to them. (736 F.2d at 1420) 
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. vs. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 578 F.2d 1341 (C.A. 10 N.M. 1978) 
the Tenth Circuit dealt with sufficiency of the interest to 
support standing to assert it in judicial review. It said that 
an interest (to sue) does not hinge on a direct interest; that 
construction being too narrow. Only can their presence be 
rejected if no property interest of any character could be 
impaired by the outcome (578 F.2d at 1344) and that interest did 
not even have to be direct (Id.). 
(The boundary was drawn where bird feathers claimed to 
be ecologically threatened were an insufficient interest to 
maintain an action, 578 F.2d at 1344.) 
The United States Supreme Court has delineated the 
"Zone of Interest" to test standing in Clarke vs. Securities 
Industry Assn., 479 U.S. , 93 L.Ed.2d 757, 107 S.Ct. 
(1987). Interpreting the National Banking Act as it applies to 
See U.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) ***[intervention is permitted as a 
right] "when the representation of the applicant's interest by 
existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or 
may be bound by a judgment***". 
branch banks, the Court held that a trade association 
representing securities brokers, inter alia, had standing to sue 
for judicial characterization of certain institutions as branch 
banks in locations offensive to the trade association, a 
characterization the Comptroller of the Currency had refused to 
adopt. Clarke recites history of lower (Circuit) Court decisions 
which had held that to be within the "Zone of Interest11 required 
a showing of a "legal interest" or alternatively occupancy of the 
status of one "aggrieved" under the relevant statute (the 
Administrative Procedures Act) permitting review by any party 
"adversely affected or aggrieved" (93 L.Ed.2d at 765, 766). [It 
is significant that Utah's statute reads comparably; i.e.: 
f!
***any person aggrieved*** may*** bring a civil action***".] 
The Supreme Court said that now, as in the past, it was unwilling 
to take the Comptroller's narrow perception of the generous 
review provisions of the Administrative Practices Act (5. U.S. 
Code §§551 et. seq.) re-affirming that it should be construed not 
"grudgingly but as serving a broadly remedial purpose". 
The precedents in Clarke as applied to this case are 
(1) that the "legal interest" test was determined to be too 
narrow. Here the State Engineer contends that because S & G had 
deeded the water right to Delta City it lost legal title to the 
subject matter. But S & G still has unquestioned equitable 
rights under the contract (the right to have the purchase price 
determined and to have it then paid); (2) S & G has standing as 
an "aggrieved party" (as we have considered in Point II hereof) 
under the specific statute authorizing this appeal (§73-3-14, 
U.C.A. 1953) and S & G is unchallengeably affected in a highly 
adverse manner. 
Citing Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. vs. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 25 L.Ed.2d 184, 90 
S.Ct. 827, the Court said that even where there were no review 
provided by statute, a person "adversely affected or aggrieved, 
i.e.: injured in fact" and whose position was "arguably" within 
the Zone of Interest to be protected by the statute, nevertheless 
had standing to sue. It cannot be denied that the owner of a 
water right subject of a sale contract whose diminution by the 
State Engineer drastically reduces the purchase price is not at a 
minimum within that "Zone of Interest" protected by statute (in 
this case §73-3-14, U.C.A. 1953). 
The Supreme Court expressly approved the trend toward 
the enlargement of the class of people who may challenge 
administrative action (93 L.Ed.2d at 767) and illustrated 
concretely a division boundary marking the zone of interest 
lines: milk handlers could seek review of a federal pricing 
order but ultimate consumers could not because so vastly 
broadening the zone would disrupt the administrative scheme. 
Summarizing, the Supreme Court circumscribed the zone 
by the following language: 
The zone of interest test is a guide for 
deciding whether, in view of Congress1 
evident intent to make agency action 
presumptively reviewable, a particular 
plaintiff should be heard to complain of a 
particular agency decision. In cases where 
the plaintiff is not itself the subject of 
the contested regulatory action, the test 
denies a right of review if the plaintiff's 
interests are so marginally related to or 
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in 
the statute that it cannot reasonably be 
assumed that Congress intended to permit the 
suit. The test is not meant to be especially 
demanding, in particular, there need be no 
indication of congressional purpose to 
benefit the would-be plaintiff. 
In Terracor vs. Utah Board of State Lands, et at., 716 
P.2d 796, (Utah 1986) at 799, Mr. Justice Stewart stated: 
11
 ***[ there are] general standards for 
determining whether a litigant has standing 
*** the first being that the plaintiff must 
be able to show some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him a personal stake in the 
outcome*** Second, he may have standing if no 
one else has a greater interest in the 
outcome of the case and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised at all unless that 
particular plaintiff has standing to raise 
the issue." 
In Berry vs. Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670 at 674, the 
Court dealt with Article I, Section 11, Constitution of the State 
of Utah, which provides: 
All courts shall be open, [to] every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person [or] 
property ***The clear language of the section 
guarantees access to the courts and a 
judicial procedure that is based on fairness 
and equality. 
Standing consists of an entity's sufficient interest in 
the outcome of litigation to warrant consideration of its 
position by a court. 
Standing is, nevertheless, not an absolute concept, but 
rather is variable, and is closely related to the nature of the 
controversy and the relief sought. Accordingly, standing is to 
be determined by the nature of the action, as well as by 
plaintiff's interest in its outcome. Moreover, in deciding the 
question of standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to 
look to the substantive issues involved for the purpose of 
determining whether there is a logical nexus between the status 
asserted by complainant and the claim sought to be adjudicated. 
Wickham vs. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981). 
A plaintiff generally has standing to sue when it has 
such a legitimate interest in a matter as to warrant asking a 
court to entertain it. 
An action may be brought on the basis of a bare legal 
title, without a beneficial interest in a cause of action, or on 
the basis of a beneficial interest in the subject matter and 
relief sought, without a legal title or interest therein. Vol. 
1A C.J.S. pp.445-447, Actions, §§59, 60. 
The statute controlling standing in this case allows an 
appeal to the District Court by an "aggrieved11 party (§73-3-14 
U.C.A. 1953). 
Watson vs. Collins, 21 Cal. Rptr. 832, 836, 204 C.A.2d 
27 says an "aggrieved party" need not be an original party to the 
transaction but merely one who has suffered prejudice or 
pecuniary loss. Deseret Mortuary Co. vs. Ogden Chamber of 
Commerce vs. State Securities Commission, 78 Utah 393, 3 P.2d 
267, 270 (1931) holds "*** the word aggrieved refers to a 
substantial grievance, a denial of some personal property right 
or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation." 
POINT IV 
WATER RIGHTS ARE VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS. 
The right to the use of water is a vested property 
interest. §73-1-1, U.C.A., 1953; Ronzio vs. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Rail Co., 116 F.2d 604 (1946); Mosby Irrigation Company 
vs. Criddle, (1960) 11 U.2d 41, 354 P.2d 848; East Bench 
Irrigation Company vs. Deseret Irrigation Company, (1954) 2 U.2d 
170, 271 P.2d 449. S & G is deprived of a vested property right 
by refusal of the District Court to allow an appeal from a 
decision which materially decreases the water right S & G owns. 
POINT V 
THE ISSUES WERE NOT MOOT. 
The Trial Court held that since S & G had deeded its 
water right to Delta City the issue was no longer justiciable and 
implied it had became moot. Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 1A pp. 
415 and 416, Actions §39, treats this issue by the following 
statement: 
On the other hand, mootness is commonly not 
found in actions which present real 
controversies affecting the substantive 
rights of the parties, or in which only one, 
or some, of several issues has become moot. 
Accordingly, an action is not moot as long as 
any single claim for either primary or 
secondary relief remains viable or where it 
remains litigable due to the continuing 
adverse effects of the events in issue or 
their collateral consequences. 
The issue is not moot for other substantial reasons: 
The decision of the State Engineer not only restricts the 
transferability of water, it also limits, if the State Engineer's 
decision is unappealable, the amount of water which S & G could 
use on its own land regardless of any sale. Stated differently, 
the State Engineer has disregarded the amount of water which has 
actually been put to a beneficial use on S & G's land. The Trial 
Court has precluded S & G from litigating that very issue. The 
contract remains executory: IPA has not paid the full amount of 
the purchase price awaiting a final determination of quantity 
that can be sold. Furthermore, S & G still owns the 228 acres to 
which the water is appurtenant and upon which it has been used. 
By disregarding actual practices the State Engineer has damaged 
S & G!s land; nevertheless, the Trial Court has denied S & G the 
right of review to determine correctness of that restriction. 
If IPA fails to pay the remainder of the purchase price 
(and it has not paid even up to the amount calculated by applying 
the reduced 3.4 acre feet factor) and S & G takes the water right 
back then the land's value, in the hands of S & G, will be 
severely diminished. 
S & G has the right to litigate not only what water 
right it can sell for municipal purposes and having sold some of 
it, what it may have left for continued crop irrigation on land 
S & G has not sold. S & G is entitled to review of the State 
Engineer's decision as to what it still has left to use on its 
land. 
If the Trial Court judgment is not reversed, the State 
Engineer's erroneous diminution of S & Gfs water right will 
become res adjudioata on both water sold and water retained at an 
unjustified lower level. 
POINT VI 
S & G IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. 
This brings us logically to the party-in-interest test. 
The same encyclopedia (17A p.740, Contracts §312) says that even 
a third party beneficiary is the real party in interest and may 
prosecute an action upon the contract in his own name under a 
real-party-in-interest statute. Utah has such a statute, Rule 
17(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring every action to be 
prosecuted in the name of the party having the real interest in 
the litigation. 
Obviously someone has an entitlement to judicial review 
of the State Engineer's decision. IPA certainly is not going to 
appeal to the District Court because it would only enlarge the 
impact grant for which IPA would receive nothing more than what 
it already has. Delta City is a volunteer, paying nothing for 
the water right (the permits were issued to IPA by Millard 
County) and has not and probably could not enforce an enlargement 
of the gratuity. 
S & G is painfully injured. The State Engineer has 
reduced the reasonable and justified expectation that S & G could 
transfer the same amount of water it has historically put to 
beneficial - and depletive - use. S & G has evidence which 
cannot be controverted which says it has so beneficially used and 
fully depleted over nine acre feet of water per acre. It cannot 
be compensated until the amount is determined by an appeal 
concluding the issue. S & G is the real and in fact the only 
party in interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Standing to sue is a threshold issue. It would be 
extraordinarily prejudicial to S & G if it cannot be heard. The 
issue is simple: cannot the only party aggrieved by the State 
Engineer's decision appeal from it to perfect the aggrieved 
party's title as contemplated by the contract and as is provided 
by law? The difference is monumental: can the State Engineer 
reduce S & G's certificated right to use 2140 acre feet per year 
to 775.2 acre feet and then deny S & G's right to appeal under a 
statute which allows "plenary review" by "any person aggrieved?" 
Except by reversal of the Trial Court's ruling that S & G has no 
standing S & G will lose a valuable, vested property as well a 
contract right. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, MclFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
By ^ ~ ^ / ; J W 
Ken Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant, S & G, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant were mailed to Michael M. Quealy, Assistant 
Attorney General, Attorney for Respondent, 1636 West North 
Temple, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah (84116), by U.S. Regular 
Mail, Postage Prepaid, on this 24th day of March, 1987, 
\ 
73-3-13 WATER AND IRRIGATION 
application therefor was not made until after v. Utah County Light & Power Co. (1909) 36 
time first fixed by engineer had elapsed. Pool U 508,105 P 289. 
73-3-13. Protests — Hearings and notice. Any other applicant or any 
user of water from any river system or water source may protest to the 
state engineer that such work is not being diligently prosecuted to comple-
tion, whereupon the state engineer shall give the applicant doing such work 
or his assigns sixty days' notice by registered mail to his last recorded 
address to appear on a date to be designated and show cause, if any he 
has, why his application shall not be declared forfeited in whole or in part, 
and on such date such applicant or his assigns shall be permitted to pro-
duce any lawful evidence tending to show compliance on his part with the 
law. At such hearing the state engineer may hear and consider any and 
all competent evidence tending to show whether or not the applicant or 
his assigns have complied with the law. If diligence is not shown by the 
applicant the state engineer may declare the application and all rights 
thereunder forfeited. The decision of forfeiture shall be final unless an 
action to review it is filed as provided by section 73-3-14. 
History: L. 1919, ch. 67, ft 53; R. S. 1933, nitely without any attempt to provide ade-
100-3-13; L. 1937, ch. 130, 91; C. 1943, quate storage facilities. If construction is not 
100-3-13. prosecuted diligently to completion, any 
other applicant or any user of water from 
Compiler's Note*. any river system or water source may protest 
The 1937 amendment added the third and to the state engineer, and upon proper show-
fourth sentences; and deleted a former third ing, state engineer may declare application 
sentence which read: T h e state engineer and all rights obtained thereunder void, 
shall allow extensions for time during which Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir 
work was prevented by the operation of legal Co. (1943) 104 U 216, 140 P 2d 638, denying 
proceedings involving an application beyond rehearing of 104 U 202, 136 P 2d 108, which 
the power of the applicant to avoid." case, however, was not an action to declare a 
forfeiture because of a failure to prosecute 
Adequate storage facilities, construction of the dams, but forfeiture 
Under this section it would seem that a based on alleged failure to use water for five 
storage right may not be kept alive indefi- years. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Notice) mmd bearing. and any rights that are granted are always 
No one can obtain any right to use of any subject to prior rights. United States v. 
wator from any public stream except upon CaldweU (1924) 64 U 490, 231 P 434, applying 
full notice and hearing before state engineer, Laws 1897 (R. S. 1898, i 1268) now repealed. 
73-3-14. Review by courts of engineer's decisions. In any case where 
a decision of the state engineer is involved any person aggrieved by such 
decision may within sixty days after notice thereof bring a civil action in 
the district court for a plenary review thereof. The state engineer shall 
give notice of his decision by mailing a copy thereof by regular mail to 
the applicant and to each protestant and notice shall be deemed to have 
been given on the date of mailing. The place of trial, subject to the power 
of the court to change the same as provided by law, shall be in the county 
in which the stream or water source, or some part thereof, is located. The 
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state engineer must be joined as a defendant in all suits to review his deci-
sions, but no judgment for costs or expenses of the litigation shall be 
rendered against him. Parties shall be served with process as in other cases 
and notice of the pendency of such action shall be filed by the clerk of 
the district court with the state engineer within twenty days after the 
same is commenced which shall operate to stay all further proceedings 
pending the decision of the district court. 
History: L. 1919 ch. 67, (64; R. S. 193S, 
100-8-14; L. 1987, ch. 180, f l ; C. 1948, 
100-8-14. 
Compiler's Note*. 
The 1987 amendment inserted the second 
and fourth sentences; and in the fifth sen-
tence, inserted "by the clerk of the district 
court" after "shall be filed." 
Cross-References, 
Change of venue, 78-18-8. 
Service of summons, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Rule 4. 
Appeal exclusive method of review. 
The only manner in which a decision of the 
state engineer may be reviewed is by way of 
appeal. Smith v. Sanders (1948) 112 U 517, 
189 P 2d 701. 
In action to have defendant's right to use 
water declared forfeited for non-use and to 
enjoin any further use thereof, trial court 
improperly granted summary judgment for 
plaintiff since state engineer had granted 
extension of time for defendant to resume 
use and plaintiff did not use proper remedy 
of civil action in district court for review of 
state engineer's decision, but rather filed 
action to have defendant's rights declared 
forfeited which resulted in an attempt by 
plaintiff to exercise authority granted spe-
cifically to state engineer to enjoin unlawful 
diversion. Glenwood Irr. Co. v. Myers (1970) 
24 U 2d 78, 465 P 2d 1018, distinguished'in 
571 P 2d 1825. 
Jurisdiction of district cour t 
District court had jurisdiction under this 
section to annul and vacate rulings and 
orders of the state engineer which were in 
conflict with a prior decree of the court even 
though the engineer was not a party to the 
action in which the prior decree was 
rendered. Nye v. Bacon (1933) 81 U 846,18 P 
2d 289. 
Where the United States, in administering 
the Federal Reclamation Act, applied to the 
engineer for a change of place of diversion, 
and claimed the right to make such a change 
under the engineer's favorable decision, it 
was subject to the jurisdiction of the district 
court to review the engineer's decision. 
United States v. District Court of Fourth 
Judicial Dist (1961) 121 U 1, 288 P 2d 1182, 
rehearing denied 121 U 18, 242 P 2d 774, dis-
tinguished in 2 U 2d 208, 271 P 2d 846. 
Notice of engineer's decision. 
Where only notice of decision of state engi-
neer was mailed by state engineer and there 
was no evidence of its receipt by appellant, 
appellant's appeal more than sixty days after 
mailing of notice was taken in time. In re 
Application 7600 to Appropriate 80 Second 
Feet of Water (1924) 63 U 811, 225 P 605. 
Perfection of appeal 
Appeal should be taken as provided in 
cases of appeal from justice's court to dis-
trict court, and it should be taken within 
sixty days from the time the aggrieved party 
receives actual or constructive notice of the 
order from which the appeal is taken. In re 
Application 7600 to Appropriate 30 Second 
Feet of Water (1924) 63 U 311, 225 P 605. 
Right of appeal. 
Under this section protestants may file 
petition in district court for a plenary review 
of decision of state engineer overruling 
protests to application for change of place of 
storage of water. Rocky Ford Irr. Co. v. 
Kents Lake Reservoir Co. (1943) 104 U 202, 
135 P 2d 108, rehearing denied 104 U 216,140 
P 2d 638. 
Where plaintiff protested to state engineer 
concerning defendant's applications to appro-
priate water from certain springs arising on 
defendant's land, and state engineer 
approved applications, plaintiff was entitled 
to have state engineer's action reviewed by 
district court Lehi Irr. Co. v. Jones (1949) 
115 U 136, 202 P 2d 892. 
Where engineer's certificate, issued in 1949, 
permitted city to store 321.78 acre feet of 
water in a specified reservoir, but between 
1949 and 1969 city was permitted to draw in 
excess of 700 acre feet each year, reduction 
after 1969 of water allowed to be drawn to 
level shown on certificate gave no cause for 
complaint; any challenge to the certificate 
should have been brought within 60 days of 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
DALLIN W. JENSEN, No. 1669 
Solicitor General 
MICHAEL M. QUEALY, No. 2667 
Assistant Attorney General 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
1636 West North Temple, Suite 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84116 
Telephone; (801) 533-4446 
MILLARD COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S & G, INC., a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT L. MORGAN, State Engineer 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7798 
Hon. Cullen Y. Christensen 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court without 
oral argument, pursuant to Rule 2.8. Plaintiff is represented by 
Robert P. Faust, Richard M. Hymas and Ken Chamberlain. Defendant 
is represented by Dallin W. Jensen and Michael M. Quealy. The 
Court has reviewed the file, including the memoranda of counsel 
submitted on the present motion, and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises did, on September 16, 1986, issue a 
ruling converting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss to one for 
Summary Judgment and granting the same, concluding that while 
Plaintiff had some interest in the decision of the Defendant 
State Engineer, such interest was collateral to the issues in 
ADDENDUM ii 
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that proceeding and such interest was not within the "Zone of 
Interest" contemplated as being a basis for appeal from the deci-
sion of the State Engineer* 
THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby converted to a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and said Motion for Summary Judgment 
be and is hereby granted, and that judgment is hereby entered 
against Plaintiff dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's Com-
plaint. Each party shall bear its own costs. 
lis j*k DATED this \*> day of £c^e»ber, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ 
LCULLEN Y-^CHRISTENSEN 
D i s t r i c t / J u d g e 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER OF 
DISMISSAL was served by mailing the same, first class postage 
prepaid, prior to signature and entry by the Court, this /y day 
of September, 1986, to: 
Richard M. Hymas 
Robert P. Faust 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Ken Chamberlain 
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
76 South Main 
RICHFIELD UT 84701 
s4u4>^PA* 
MICHAEL M. QUEA^ jY 
Assistant Attorney Ge 
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CERTIFICATE OF APPROPRIATION OF-WATER 
STATE OF UTAH 
WtUt Ustc'i Claun No, 6 8 - 5 3 1 Application No. S - 5 1 2 9 Certificate Ho. JS&L 
L Name and address of appropdato? Jay ? . Gardner and Richard M> Gardner 
385 East Center Street, Richfield, Utah 
Whereas, it has been made to appear to the satisfaction of the undersigned that the appropriation of 
water has been perfected under the above numbered application In accordance with the Laws of Utah, Therefore, 
Be it known that the State Engineer hereby certifies that said appropriate is entitled to the use of water subject 
to poor rights, if any, as follows: 
2. Period and nature of use-
Irrigation 
Domestic 
Stockwatering 
Municipal 
Other 
ft*™ . AprU I 
from 
from ^ 
from „_______________„ 
from 
.*° , .tet<fter 31 
^to 
to 
JO 
to 
3. 
4. 
S. 
«. 
7. 
Source of supply 
Drainage area 
Quantity of water 
Priority of rie>t
 n 
foint of diversion 
Underground Water (well) 
Sevier River 
5*0 c . f . s . 
August 5, 1959 
South 30 feet Vest 20 feet from the KB Corner 
Section 17, T17S, R6W, SL3M 
Millard 
m County, Utah. 
8. Method of diversion 16-inch diameter vei l , 83^ feet deep 
9. Place and/or eatent of use: I r r i g a t i o n ; 3 7 - 8 8 a C S . !&?£&*{• 
9.10 acs. R s J ^ i 
36.60 acs. m*50h 
7.58 ecs. KElSwJ Section 16, T17S, R6W, SISM 
37.10 acs. RWIHBJ 
37.00 ocs. E3*fle£ 
37.32 acs. SW*fig* 
38.50 acs, S^NB| 
I3.5O ecs. HtffeSf 
38.17 ecs. HsJssJ Section 17, T17S, R6W, SLBH 
or a t o t a l of 292.75 acres 
Shis right i s Hal ted to the Irr igat ion requirements of 2**0 acres. 
10. Other rights appurtenant Melville I r r igat ion Company, from Sevier River (kO shares) 
The works employed in this appropriation are to be operated and malntabed in such a manner and condition as 
will prevent waste of water. This certificate entitles the holder to use only sufficient water frora all rights combined 
to constitute an economic duty without waste. 
The right evidenced by this certificate is subject to review by the courts (a any adjudication proceeding. 
of 
In Witness Whereof, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of my office this
 m 
June
 f ig67 
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AMENDMENT TO WATER RIGHT PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This Contract made and entered in to t h i s day o f 
Apr i l , 1981, between INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY, a p o l i t i c a l 
subdiv i s ion of the S ta te of Utah, created pursuant to the 
In ter loca l Co-operation Act (Chapter 13, T i t l e 11, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended), with i t s p r i n c i p a l o f f i c e at 
Sandy, County of Sa l t Lake, State of Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r s t y l e d 
IPA, and S & G, INC., a Utah corporat ion , o f R i c h f i e l d , County 
o f Sev i er , State of Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r s t y l e d SELLER 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, on the 22nd day of July, 1980, SELLER and IPA 
entered into a Water Right Purchase Contract and accompany-
ing Escrow Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto 
marked Exhibit "I", wherein SELLER agreed to sell and IPA 
agreed to purchase the first right to 521,00 acre feet of 
water annually evidenced by SELLER'S Water Right, as amended 
by SELLER'S Change Application all as more particularly set 
forth therein; and 
WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend, modify and sup-
plement the following specific provisions of said Water Right 
Purchase Contract as specifically hereinafter provided* 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually understood and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto as follows: 
A. ARTICLE III IS AMENDED IN ITS ENTIRETY 
TO READ AS FOLLOWS: 
ARTICLE III 
Purchase and Sale 
3. IPA agrees to purchase and SELLER agrees to s e l l 
to IPA a divided and e x c l u s i v e r i g h t to the d i v e r s i o n and 
use of s u f f i c i e n t waters under C e r t i f i c a t e of Appropriation 
No, 7865 (68-531) (SELLERS Water Right) to s a t i s f y the s o l e 
i r r i g a t i o n requirements of 228*0 acres of land for the sum 
of 
(a) Nine Hundred Eleven Thousand Seven Hundred 
F i f ty Dol lars ($911,750 .00) based on 521 .0 acre f e e t 
annually at the ra te of One Thousand Seven Hundred 
F i f ty Dol lars (§1 ,750 .00) per acre f o o t , p lus 
(b) The sum of Forty-Eight Thousand Seven Hun-
dred Nine Dollars Ninety-Three Cents ($48,709.93) as 
the agreed adjustment to the preceding subparagraph 
(a) based on the January 2, 1980/ prime interest rate 
of the Citibank of New York, plus 
(c) The sum equal to Eight Hundred Seventy-Five 
Dollars ($875.00) times the number of acre feet in ex-
cess of 521.0 acre feet annually which shall be approved 
for diversion and use for municipal purposes under the 
proposed change application referred to in paragraph 
8 hereinafter by 
(i) the final written Decision of the Utah 
State Engineer without judicial review, or 
(ii) the final judgment of approval by the 
appropriate District Court without appeal to the 
Utah Supreme Court, or 
(iii) the final decision of approval by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
In the event the Utah State Engineer in the first 
instance, or the Court on judicial review thereafter, 
does not fix the quantity of water in acre feet which 
can be diverted and used for such municipal purposes 
under such change application the quantity will be 
presumed to be 4.0 acre feet per acre for purposes 
of fixing the amount of the foregoing payment. IPA 
shall pay to SELLER interest on the sum so deter-
mined at the rate of 11.747% per annum commencing on a 
date seven months after the date of this Amendment to 
Water Right Purchase Contract or commencing on a date 
30 days after the final written decision of the Utah 
State Engineer provided for in subparagraph 3(c)(i) 
above, whichever is earlier, until the date of payment 
under paragraph 7 hereinafter, plus 
(d) The sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00). 
4. The sum provided for in paragraph 3(a) hereinabove 
was deposited with the Depositary on February 23, 1981. 
5. The sum provided for in paragraph 3(a) above shall 
be disbursed by Depositary and the Warranty Deed to the water 
right herein purchased shall be delivered by Depositary to 
IPA, all strictly in accordance with the provisions of the 
ADDENDUM vii 
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